Thoughts From Deployed Civilian in Afghanistan

Monday, June 28, 2010

I've been at the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team for three weeks and I just attended my third memorial service. On a day to day basis it's easy to forget that you're operating in a war zone, especially if you never leave the camp or live in a place like Kabul. You go about your day to day business and never really have a connection to the people who go outside the wire looking for trouble, so hopefully I and those back home won't have to. But it's hard to ignore it when the reminder is right there in front of you all of the time.

Every person on the camp shows up to these memorials. At the end, everybody except the Soldier's unit dispersed while the unit pays their respect to the deceased. Generally most people don't look back. Today I stayed behind for a bit to watch as the unit filed through to give their comrades one last salute. I don't know why I did. I guess it just seemed like the thing to do. Or maybe I was just a little lost in the moment; trying to comprehend what would it means to never come home. You'd think that I'd be used to this by now, but it never gets any easier.
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McChrystal-izing a Problem: The Militarization of American Statecraft

McChrystal-izing a Problem: The Militarization of American Statecraft
June 23, 2010


by Gordon Adams
Budget Insight, Stimson Center

General Stanley McChrystal’s candid disrespect for civilian leadership is being treated as an issue of bad judgment and personality. But this episode reveals a much deeper dilemma for American statecraft, one that has long roots but has reached near crisis proportions over the past ten years: the gradual erosion of civilian leadership and the militarization of our foreign and security policy.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen warned about this trend in remarks to the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University last year, but it has been under way for years. Its manifestations include:

* DOD and the military now define what America’s national security strategy will be. The DOD strategic document – the Quadrennial Defense Review – was for many months the only definitive description of our strategy; the National Security Strategy followed, and is significantly less informative or clear. DOD has for years done our only real national strategy planning, well ahead of any White House guidance.

* DOD and the military have determined that our most important engagement abroad will be to fight terrorist and insurgents, despite the fact that terrorist tactics hardly threaten our existence and, outside of insurgents in Afghanistan (and in decline in Iraq) it is not clear either that there are a lot of insurgencies for us to fight or that other countries will welcome a major US military presence to deal with those that do exist.

* The regional combatant commanders are a more prominent US forward presence in most regions of the world than our ambassadors or regional Assistant Secretaries of State.

* These same regional combatant commanders seek to become the “hub” around which all US government agencies engage the world. Adm. James Stavrides, as COCOM for Latin America described that command as a “velcro cube” to which other civilian agencies could attach. AFRICOM was deliberately created to be such a command, despite the absence of any formal civilian role or authority in the operations of such a command.

* The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) was designed and implemented as a development assistance program entirely under the authority of the local commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. In funding, it is as large as thecivilian Millennium Challenge Corporation and nearly as large as USAID’s development assistance (DA) funds. During the Bush administration, DOD sought to make CERP a global development assistance program and an article in the latest Foreign Affairs proposes that the military be given responsibility for all US bilateral development assistance.

* (more…)

Oldie but Goodie: No End in Sight

A jaw dropping account even if you already know the story.

The Wonks of War

For those eager to learn more about what went wrong in Iraq, there's No End in Sight.

By Kelly Vance

So how did we lose the war in Iraq? Let us count the ways. Or rather, let Charles Ferguson's devastating new documentary, No End in Sight, total up the blunders for us.

Berkeley resident Ferguson, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations as well as a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, wrote, produced, and directed the film, his first, to provide what he calls "a rigorously accurate, comprehensive film about Iraq" and the United States' involvement in that country.

Because Ferguson is a political scientist, No End in Sight differs from the documentaries and narrative films that have tried to explain America's adventure in Iraq anecdotally. In place of the subjective tone-poetics of Iraq in Fragments, the foot soldier's slice of life in Gunner Palace, or the behind-the-scenes broadcast-media politics of Control Room — all worthy films in their own right — Ferguson's chronicle trots out a procession of policy wonks: think-tank advisers, former government officials from both the United States and Iraq (those who agreed to talk, of course), and journalists, plus a few military thrown in for emphasis. There's no shortage of opinion, but what Ferguson is aiming for in this fascinating 102-minute dissection is a professional critique of foreign policy. (more....)

The Future U.S. Organization for Peace Operations

April 22, 2010

by: Laura A. Hall

Note: This is adapted from remarks given at the book launch for U.S. Peacefare. Audio of the full event including remarks by the author Amb. Dane Smith, former USAID Deputy Administrator Jim Kunder, and LtGen John Sattler (USMC ret) as well as Q&A is available here.

With the publication of his book, Ambassador Dane Smith has compiled the first and most comprehensive account of the US perspective’s on the recent history of international peacebuilding. Having spent the last six years at the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the NSC, I would like to build onto the book’s recommendations.

• Lead Agency Model: It is appropriate and important that interagency coordination be vested in a “lead agency” and that it be the Department of State.

The Secretary of State needs to maintain responsibility for foreign policy direction. In drafting the NSPD-44, there was little debate that the Secretary of State needed to maintain responsibility for foreign policy direction including for coordinating across civ-mil lines. State’s having a leadership role does not suggest collecting all the operational parts of State, USAID, and the interagency into one office that would take over and run post-conflict operations. Having State in a lead role on policy and coordination and developing more operational and expeditionary diplomats is not a threat to USAID’s responsibilities.

From a management perspective a consolidation would be a disaster. It would separate personnel from one another across somewhat fuzzy boundaries between crisis response and conflict prevention and between early recovery and long term development. The personnel would also lose the benefits of being part of larger organizations with broad responsibilities which provides much of the advantages of calling on the larger US government capabilities. In addition, policy makers would never agree on criteria for shifting responsibility from the steady-state actors (regional bureaus and embassies) to the crisis response actors. The process of transferring policy and operational responsibility would be severely handicapped by bureaucratic turf battles.

• Elevate and empower the NSC: To ensure effective processes, the NSC must take responsibility for directing interagency decision making.

In the deliberations about how to meet the need for crisis response, NSC leadership was clear that the NSC should not become operational. However, there is a need for greater authority and responsibility than is currently provided.

The past and current position of Director of Stability Operations is one person, buried within the org chart, who gets minimal attention and support from above. The NSC should be providing direction and guidance on contingency planning priorities, demanding better planning products, enforcing decision making, and insisting on integrated efforts. A higher level position for the lead officer on stability operations, additional staff who can support regional directorates in their planning efforts, and a coherent NSC structure connecting development, humanitarian response, stability operations, international organization affairs, and defense would improve the ability of the NSC to exercise these responsibilities. A greater role doesn’t mean doing all of the planning and taking responsibility away from line departments. Doing so would decrease the responsibility they would feel and leave the NSC conducting planning in a vacuum.

• Decision Making, Planning, and Integration: Recognize the importance of effective processes and the need for management arrangements, personnel, and doctrine.

There remains a deficiency in the policy community’s understanding of what is needed for more effective operations. Most critics focus on the need for greater civilian capacity for deployments and that need is in no dispute. S/CRS has made progress in this endeavor. However, one of the primary reasons behind the creation of S/CRS was to address the need for better management and organization of complex operations. Managing complex operations requires identifying clear responsibilities for integration of efforts (civ-mil, interagency, and international), providing support to decision making processes, and coordinating planning and execution of operations.

These are not typical functions and require different kinds of personnel who are trained and can apply lessons learned from other operations, who are prepared and available to immediately start supporting the Regional bureau and Embassy decision makers in planning processes and setting up staffing. It also requires a common operating “doctrine” that guides the process so that the many moving parts know how to work together. This coordination function requires something more than meetings to de-conflict efforts and it cannot be done in an ad hoc manner. Complex operations require something more formalized, based in lessons-learned, to be effective. Even a special envoy, which can be useful in many circumstances, needs a staff and eventually must develop more standardized processes. (more…)

The Danger Zone: Managing and Supporting Civilians in Difficult and Dangerous Locations

by Laura A. Hall (Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in residence at the Stimson Center.)

Deploying U.S. government civilians to difficult and dangerous places is nothing new. Plaques to fallen colleagues in the lobbies of the Department of State and USAID remind us of those who have died in overseas operations. However, in recent years our nation has asked a lot more of our civilian government personnel, and not only in Iraq and Afghanistan.

On April 14, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia (HSGAC/OGM) will hold a hearing on personnel benefits and support for deployed civilians in combat zones. This follows on the inquiries by Government Accountability Office, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, and the House Committee on Government Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia.

The New Normal

Today, many embassies remain open under security situations which, in the past, would have led to certain closure. More posts are at risk of attack in spite of the unwelcoming “fortress America” building standards. Civilians have deployed embedded within military units. An increasing proportion of assignments are so dangerous that families do not join employees overseas. The number of posts qualifying for hardship and danger pay has increased. The scope and scale of civilian engagement has expanded, placing greater numbers and types of employees at risk.

And more names have been added to the plaques.

The decisions to send civilians to these missions have been made, in spite of their cost, because of the absolute centrality of civilian diplomacy and development to today’s missions. The history of PRT deployments – and more importantly, experiences where the military has had limited access to civilian advisors and partners – demonstrates this powerfully. Their presence is equally vital to the international community’s legitimacy and effectiveness in lesser-known engagements in places like Darfur and Eastern Congo. Even in traditional posts, like those in Pakistan and Mexico are increasingly dangerous as recent attacks have tragically proven.

These assignments are becoming the “new normal,” and have broad implications for recruitment, training, support, medical care, benefits, incentives, and career paths within the Foreign Service and the civil services of many departments. They also raise serious questions about the roles of diplomats and development professionals in non-permissive environments, and how to manage risk while increasing access to populations and environments that are critical to U.S. engagement.

Key Congressional Questions

The upcoming HSGAC/OGM hearing, and follow-up work on legislation and requisite funding, should wrestle with a few key areas.

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PRTs in Afghanistan: More for Less?

PRTs in Afghanistan: More for Less? March 10, 2010
by Matthew Leatherman

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept has been both a source of policy inspiration and controversy – inspiration because of the way that U.S. diplomats, aid workers, and service-members adapted to circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan, and controversy because of the teams’ ad hoc and near-term approach to operations.

Funding for these teams illustrates each of these characteristics. A heavy reliance on the Defense Department’s Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) allows for quick and flexible funding in response to needs in the field, but also tilts another interagency concept toward DOD. As CERP funding has grown, reaching $1.2 billion in FY2010, so too has the dilemma.

Like an apprentice subject to the interference of a hovering mentor, the Government of Afghanistan is nearly suffocating from this attention. PRTs’ uncommonly deep pockets, with finances that exceed some national donations, aggravate already-complex donor politics, according to Mark Ward of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Even more substantially, Ward noted, PRT resources crowd out the Afghan government’s development efforts. In so doing, the PRTs increasingly stunt the government’s maturation and undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people.

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Peace-Building Training: An Imperative for U.S. Diplomats

Peace-Building Training: An Imperative for U.S. Diplomats

By Ambassador Dane Smith and Laura A. Hall
Ambassador Dane Smith, Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Adjunct Professor at American University and Laura A. Hall, Council on Foreign Relations Fellow and in residence at the Stimson Center.

The State Department stands at the center of peace-building in the U.S. Government. That is because diplomacy is at its core about conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and most post-conflict reconstruction. Most conflicts in the post-Cold War era are intra-state rather than inter-state in nature, rooted in specific regional contexts. They involve governments, disaffected regions or minorities, a breakdown of law and order, and impact on neighboring countries. These new kinds of conflicts draw on the same diplomatic base but require new ways of operating.

Criticism of State’s crisis response mechanisms have tended to focus on the growing pains and sometimes marginal role of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), created in 2004 to staff the Secretary of State in her responsibilities to coordinate U.S. civilian agencies in responding to overseas conflict.[1] In principle, S/CRS, as the locus of expertise for whole-of-government conflict management, should be the primary peace-building partner of the geographic bureaus within the State Department. During its almost six years of existence, S/CRS has learned a lot about conflict management. It has deployed to more than 20 countries and has done useful planning for contingencies and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization including in Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. It has been building an expeditionary capacity to respond to overseas crises (Civilian Response Corps) that is funded to grow to 250 active-duty, on-call, full-time, highly-trained professionals from eight executive branch departments and agencies. It has managed hundred millions of dollars in reconstruction projects in more than a dozen countries. It has developed with the Foreign Service Institute a constellation of courses on conflict management, conflict response, planning, and deployment security.

However, it has played no role in Iraq and has been only a marginal presence in Afghanistan. In the cases of Lebanon (2006) and Somalia (2007), its efforts to get involved were stiff-armed by the geographic bureaus. Its future is uncertain and may depend on the outcome of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review initiated by Secretary of State Clinton.

While a central management and planning function and a trained specialty cadre of first responders are certainly needed, conflict management is the “day job” of the Department of State and its Embassies. Embassies – and the State Department geographic bureaus they report to — have direct knowledge of the situations in these countries of concern and are usually in the best position to make judgments about the seriousness of a potential conflict and the appropriate U.S. reactions. They are already on-the-ground, have the relationships, and will be there after the first response is over. Therefore it is critical to address a major weakness of geographic bureaus and their regional and country experts. With few exceptions, their personnel are untrained in conflict management.

Since the end of the Cold War, conflict has become a major concern for State officers overseas and in Washington. Political officers assigned to posts in much of the world – Africa, the Middle East, South and Central Asia, Latin America and Southeast Asia – are often involved in reporting on and making policy recommendations relating to conflict. Economic officers may be charged with responsibilities for reporting on the sources of funding for insurgencies, weighing the efficacy of sanctions, or assessing the economic recovery effects of post-conflict reconstruction projects. Public affairs officers find themselves explaining U.S. policies and actions concerning political strife abroad. Those from other specialties – consular and administrative – may find themselves dealing with conflict when they work as country desk officers. Foreign Service Officers, faced with conflict, work doggedly and often imaginatively to achieve U.S. objectives. Sometimes they do a terrific job, but not because they know anything about conflict management. They could do better if they were trained and not starting from scratch. (more…)