Wednesday, March 10, 2010
PRTs in Afghanistan: More for Less?
PRTs in Afghanistan: More for Less? March 10, 2010
by Matthew Leatherman
The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept has been both a source of policy inspiration and controversy – inspiration because of the way that U.S. diplomats, aid workers, and service-members adapted to circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan, and controversy because of the teams’ ad hoc and near-term approach to operations.
Funding for these teams illustrates each of these characteristics. A heavy reliance on the Defense Department’s Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) allows for quick and flexible funding in response to needs in the field, but also tilts another interagency concept toward DOD. As CERP funding has grown, reaching $1.2 billion in FY2010, so too has the dilemma.
Like an apprentice subject to the interference of a hovering mentor, the Government of Afghanistan is nearly suffocating from this attention. PRTs’ uncommonly deep pockets, with finances that exceed some national donations, aggravate already-complex donor politics, according to Mark Ward of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Even more substantially, Ward noted, PRT resources crowd out the Afghan government’s development efforts. In so doing, the PRTs increasingly stunt the government’s maturation and undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people.
(more…)
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
Peace-Building Training: An Imperative for U.S. Diplomats
Peace-Building Training: An Imperative for U.S. Diplomats
By Ambassador Dane Smith and Laura A. Hall
Ambassador Dane Smith, Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Adjunct Professor at American University and Laura A. Hall, Council on Foreign Relations Fellow and in residence at the Stimson Center.
The State Department stands at the center of peace-building in the U.S. Government. That is because diplomacy is at its core about conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and most post-conflict reconstruction. Most conflicts in the post-Cold War era are intra-state rather than inter-state in nature, rooted in specific regional contexts. They involve governments, disaffected regions or minorities, a breakdown of law and order, and impact on neighboring countries. These new kinds of conflicts draw on the same diplomatic base but require new ways of operating.
Criticism of State’s crisis response mechanisms have tended to focus on the growing pains and sometimes marginal role of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), created in 2004 to staff the Secretary of State in her responsibilities to coordinate U.S. civilian agencies in responding to overseas conflict.[1] In principle, S/CRS, as the locus of expertise for whole-of-government conflict management, should be the primary peace-building partner of the geographic bureaus within the State Department. During its almost six years of existence, S/CRS has learned a lot about conflict management. It has deployed to more than 20 countries and has done useful planning for contingencies and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization including in Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. It has been building an expeditionary capacity to respond to overseas crises (Civilian Response Corps) that is funded to grow to 250 active-duty, on-call, full-time, highly-trained professionals from eight executive branch departments and agencies. It has managed hundred millions of dollars in reconstruction projects in more than a dozen countries. It has developed with the Foreign Service Institute a constellation of courses on conflict management, conflict response, planning, and deployment security.
However, it has played no role in Iraq and has been only a marginal presence in Afghanistan. In the cases of Lebanon (2006) and Somalia (2007), its efforts to get involved were stiff-armed by the geographic bureaus. Its future is uncertain and may depend on the outcome of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review initiated by Secretary of State Clinton.
While a central management and planning function and a trained specialty cadre of first responders are certainly needed, conflict management is the “day job” of the Department of State and its Embassies. Embassies – and the State Department geographic bureaus they report to — have direct knowledge of the situations in these countries of concern and are usually in the best position to make judgments about the seriousness of a potential conflict and the appropriate U.S. reactions. They are already on-the-ground, have the relationships, and will be there after the first response is over. Therefore it is critical to address a major weakness of geographic bureaus and their regional and country experts. With few exceptions, their personnel are untrained in conflict management.
Since the end of the Cold War, conflict has become a major concern for State officers overseas and in Washington. Political officers assigned to posts in much of the world – Africa, the Middle East, South and Central Asia, Latin America and Southeast Asia – are often involved in reporting on and making policy recommendations relating to conflict. Economic officers may be charged with responsibilities for reporting on the sources of funding for insurgencies, weighing the efficacy of sanctions, or assessing the economic recovery effects of post-conflict reconstruction projects. Public affairs officers find themselves explaining U.S. policies and actions concerning political strife abroad. Those from other specialties – consular and administrative – may find themselves dealing with conflict when they work as country desk officers. Foreign Service Officers, faced with conflict, work doggedly and often imaginatively to achieve U.S. objectives. Sometimes they do a terrific job, but not because they know anything about conflict management. They could do better if they were trained and not starting from scratch. (more…)
By Ambassador Dane Smith and Laura A. Hall
Ambassador Dane Smith, Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Adjunct Professor at American University and Laura A. Hall, Council on Foreign Relations Fellow and in residence at the Stimson Center.
The State Department stands at the center of peace-building in the U.S. Government. That is because diplomacy is at its core about conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and most post-conflict reconstruction. Most conflicts in the post-Cold War era are intra-state rather than inter-state in nature, rooted in specific regional contexts. They involve governments, disaffected regions or minorities, a breakdown of law and order, and impact on neighboring countries. These new kinds of conflicts draw on the same diplomatic base but require new ways of operating.
Criticism of State’s crisis response mechanisms have tended to focus on the growing pains and sometimes marginal role of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), created in 2004 to staff the Secretary of State in her responsibilities to coordinate U.S. civilian agencies in responding to overseas conflict.[1] In principle, S/CRS, as the locus of expertise for whole-of-government conflict management, should be the primary peace-building partner of the geographic bureaus within the State Department. During its almost six years of existence, S/CRS has learned a lot about conflict management. It has deployed to more than 20 countries and has done useful planning for contingencies and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization including in Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. It has been building an expeditionary capacity to respond to overseas crises (Civilian Response Corps) that is funded to grow to 250 active-duty, on-call, full-time, highly-trained professionals from eight executive branch departments and agencies. It has managed hundred millions of dollars in reconstruction projects in more than a dozen countries. It has developed with the Foreign Service Institute a constellation of courses on conflict management, conflict response, planning, and deployment security.
However, it has played no role in Iraq and has been only a marginal presence in Afghanistan. In the cases of Lebanon (2006) and Somalia (2007), its efforts to get involved were stiff-armed by the geographic bureaus. Its future is uncertain and may depend on the outcome of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review initiated by Secretary of State Clinton.
While a central management and planning function and a trained specialty cadre of first responders are certainly needed, conflict management is the “day job” of the Department of State and its Embassies. Embassies – and the State Department geographic bureaus they report to — have direct knowledge of the situations in these countries of concern and are usually in the best position to make judgments about the seriousness of a potential conflict and the appropriate U.S. reactions. They are already on-the-ground, have the relationships, and will be there after the first response is over. Therefore it is critical to address a major weakness of geographic bureaus and their regional and country experts. With few exceptions, their personnel are untrained in conflict management.
Since the end of the Cold War, conflict has become a major concern for State officers overseas and in Washington. Political officers assigned to posts in much of the world – Africa, the Middle East, South and Central Asia, Latin America and Southeast Asia – are often involved in reporting on and making policy recommendations relating to conflict. Economic officers may be charged with responsibilities for reporting on the sources of funding for insurgencies, weighing the efficacy of sanctions, or assessing the economic recovery effects of post-conflict reconstruction projects. Public affairs officers find themselves explaining U.S. policies and actions concerning political strife abroad. Those from other specialties – consular and administrative – may find themselves dealing with conflict when they work as country desk officers. Foreign Service Officers, faced with conflict, work doggedly and often imaginatively to achieve U.S. objectives. Sometimes they do a terrific job, but not because they know anything about conflict management. They could do better if they were trained and not starting from scratch. (more…)
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