Oldie but Goodie: No End in Sight

A jaw dropping account even if you already know the story.

The Wonks of War

For those eager to learn more about what went wrong in Iraq, there's No End in Sight.

By Kelly Vance

So how did we lose the war in Iraq? Let us count the ways. Or rather, let Charles Ferguson's devastating new documentary, No End in Sight, total up the blunders for us.

Berkeley resident Ferguson, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations as well as a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, wrote, produced, and directed the film, his first, to provide what he calls "a rigorously accurate, comprehensive film about Iraq" and the United States' involvement in that country.

Because Ferguson is a political scientist, No End in Sight differs from the documentaries and narrative films that have tried to explain America's adventure in Iraq anecdotally. In place of the subjective tone-poetics of Iraq in Fragments, the foot soldier's slice of life in Gunner Palace, or the behind-the-scenes broadcast-media politics of Control Room — all worthy films in their own right — Ferguson's chronicle trots out a procession of policy wonks: think-tank advisers, former government officials from both the United States and Iraq (those who agreed to talk, of course), and journalists, plus a few military thrown in for emphasis. There's no shortage of opinion, but what Ferguson is aiming for in this fascinating 102-minute dissection is a professional critique of foreign policy. (more....)

The Future U.S. Organization for Peace Operations

April 22, 2010

by: Laura A. Hall

Note: This is adapted from remarks given at the book launch for U.S. Peacefare. Audio of the full event including remarks by the author Amb. Dane Smith, former USAID Deputy Administrator Jim Kunder, and LtGen John Sattler (USMC ret) as well as Q&A is available here.

With the publication of his book, Ambassador Dane Smith has compiled the first and most comprehensive account of the US perspective’s on the recent history of international peacebuilding. Having spent the last six years at the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the NSC, I would like to build onto the book’s recommendations.

• Lead Agency Model: It is appropriate and important that interagency coordination be vested in a “lead agency” and that it be the Department of State.

The Secretary of State needs to maintain responsibility for foreign policy direction. In drafting the NSPD-44, there was little debate that the Secretary of State needed to maintain responsibility for foreign policy direction including for coordinating across civ-mil lines. State’s having a leadership role does not suggest collecting all the operational parts of State, USAID, and the interagency into one office that would take over and run post-conflict operations. Having State in a lead role on policy and coordination and developing more operational and expeditionary diplomats is not a threat to USAID’s responsibilities.

From a management perspective a consolidation would be a disaster. It would separate personnel from one another across somewhat fuzzy boundaries between crisis response and conflict prevention and between early recovery and long term development. The personnel would also lose the benefits of being part of larger organizations with broad responsibilities which provides much of the advantages of calling on the larger US government capabilities. In addition, policy makers would never agree on criteria for shifting responsibility from the steady-state actors (regional bureaus and embassies) to the crisis response actors. The process of transferring policy and operational responsibility would be severely handicapped by bureaucratic turf battles.

• Elevate and empower the NSC: To ensure effective processes, the NSC must take responsibility for directing interagency decision making.

In the deliberations about how to meet the need for crisis response, NSC leadership was clear that the NSC should not become operational. However, there is a need for greater authority and responsibility than is currently provided.

The past and current position of Director of Stability Operations is one person, buried within the org chart, who gets minimal attention and support from above. The NSC should be providing direction and guidance on contingency planning priorities, demanding better planning products, enforcing decision making, and insisting on integrated efforts. A higher level position for the lead officer on stability operations, additional staff who can support regional directorates in their planning efforts, and a coherent NSC structure connecting development, humanitarian response, stability operations, international organization affairs, and defense would improve the ability of the NSC to exercise these responsibilities. A greater role doesn’t mean doing all of the planning and taking responsibility away from line departments. Doing so would decrease the responsibility they would feel and leave the NSC conducting planning in a vacuum.

• Decision Making, Planning, and Integration: Recognize the importance of effective processes and the need for management arrangements, personnel, and doctrine.

There remains a deficiency in the policy community’s understanding of what is needed for more effective operations. Most critics focus on the need for greater civilian capacity for deployments and that need is in no dispute. S/CRS has made progress in this endeavor. However, one of the primary reasons behind the creation of S/CRS was to address the need for better management and organization of complex operations. Managing complex operations requires identifying clear responsibilities for integration of efforts (civ-mil, interagency, and international), providing support to decision making processes, and coordinating planning and execution of operations.

These are not typical functions and require different kinds of personnel who are trained and can apply lessons learned from other operations, who are prepared and available to immediately start supporting the Regional bureau and Embassy decision makers in planning processes and setting up staffing. It also requires a common operating “doctrine” that guides the process so that the many moving parts know how to work together. This coordination function requires something more than meetings to de-conflict efforts and it cannot be done in an ad hoc manner. Complex operations require something more formalized, based in lessons-learned, to be effective. Even a special envoy, which can be useful in many circumstances, needs a staff and eventually must develop more standardized processes. (more…)

The Danger Zone: Managing and Supporting Civilians in Difficult and Dangerous Locations

by Laura A. Hall (Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in residence at the Stimson Center.)

Deploying U.S. government civilians to difficult and dangerous places is nothing new. Plaques to fallen colleagues in the lobbies of the Department of State and USAID remind us of those who have died in overseas operations. However, in recent years our nation has asked a lot more of our civilian government personnel, and not only in Iraq and Afghanistan.

On April 14, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia (HSGAC/OGM) will hold a hearing on personnel benefits and support for deployed civilians in combat zones. This follows on the inquiries by Government Accountability Office, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, and the House Committee on Government Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia.

The New Normal

Today, many embassies remain open under security situations which, in the past, would have led to certain closure. More posts are at risk of attack in spite of the unwelcoming “fortress America” building standards. Civilians have deployed embedded within military units. An increasing proportion of assignments are so dangerous that families do not join employees overseas. The number of posts qualifying for hardship and danger pay has increased. The scope and scale of civilian engagement has expanded, placing greater numbers and types of employees at risk.

And more names have been added to the plaques.

The decisions to send civilians to these missions have been made, in spite of their cost, because of the absolute centrality of civilian diplomacy and development to today’s missions. The history of PRT deployments – and more importantly, experiences where the military has had limited access to civilian advisors and partners – demonstrates this powerfully. Their presence is equally vital to the international community’s legitimacy and effectiveness in lesser-known engagements in places like Darfur and Eastern Congo. Even in traditional posts, like those in Pakistan and Mexico are increasingly dangerous as recent attacks have tragically proven.

These assignments are becoming the “new normal,” and have broad implications for recruitment, training, support, medical care, benefits, incentives, and career paths within the Foreign Service and the civil services of many departments. They also raise serious questions about the roles of diplomats and development professionals in non-permissive environments, and how to manage risk while increasing access to populations and environments that are critical to U.S. engagement.

Key Congressional Questions

The upcoming HSGAC/OGM hearing, and follow-up work on legislation and requisite funding, should wrestle with a few key areas.

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